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Abstract—A promising area of application for Network Func-
tion Virtualization is in network security, where chains of Virtual
Security Network Functions (VSNFs), i.e., security-specific virtual
functions such as firewalls or Intrusion Prevention Systems,
can be dynamically created and configured to inspect, filter
or monitor the network traffic. However, the traffic handled
by VSNFs could be sensitive to specific network requirements,
such as minimum bandwidth or maximum end-to-end latency.
Therefore, the decision on which VSNFs should apply for a
given application, where to place them and how to connect them,
should take such requirements into consideration. Otherwise,
security services could affect the quality of service experienced
by customers.
In this paper we propose PESS (Progressive Embedding of
Security Services), a solution to efficiently deploy chains of vir-
tualised security functions based on the security requirements of
individual applications and operators’ policies, while optimizing
resource utilization. We provide the PESS mathematical model
and heuristic solution.
Simulation results show that, compared to state-of-the-art
application-agnostic VSNF provisioning models, PESS reduces
computational resource utilization by up to 50%, in different
network scenarios. This result ultimately leads to a higher
number of provisioned security services and to up to a 40%
reduction in end-to-end latency of application traffic.
Index Terms—Network Function Virtualization, Network Ser-
vice Chaining, Progressive Embedding, Application-Aware Net-
work Security.
I. INTRODUCTION
Network security implemented by Telecommunication Ser-
vice Providers (TSPs) has traditionally been based on the
deployment of specialized, closed, proprietary Hardware Ap-
pliances (HAs). Such HAs are inflexible in terms of function-
alities and placement in the network, which means that even
slight changes in the security requirements generally necessi-
tate manually intensive and time-consuming re-configuration
tasks, the replacement of existing HAs or the deployment of
additional HAs.
The Network Function Virtualization (NFV) [1] initiative
has been proposed as a possible solution to address the
operational challenges and high costs of managing proprietary
HAs. The main idea behind NFV is to transform network
functions (e.g. firewalls, intrusion detection systems etc.) based
on proprietary HAs, into software components (called Virtual
Network Functions (VNFs)) that can be deployed and executed
in virtual machines on commodity, high-performance servers.
By decoupling software from hardware, this approach allows
any (security) network function to be deployed in any server
connected to the network through an automated and logically
centralized management system.
The centralized management system, called NFV Manage-
ment and Orchestration (NFV MANO), controls the whole
life-cycle of each VNF. In addition, the NFV MANO can
dynamically provision complex network services in the form
of sequences (often called chains) of VNFs. Indeed, Network
Service Chaining (NSC) is a technique for selecting subsets
of the network traffic and forcing them to traverse various
VNFs in sequence. For example, a firewall followed by an
Intrusion Prevention System (IPS), then a Network Address
Translation (NAT) service and so on. NSC and NFV enable
flexible, dynamic service chain modifications to meet the real
time network demands.
A promising area of application for NSC and NFV is in
network security, where chains of Virtual Security Network
Functions (VSNFs), i.e., security-specific VNFs such as a
firewall or an IPS, can be dynamically created and configured
to inspect, filter or monitor the network traffic. The flexibility
of the NSC and NFV paradigms brings many benefits, among
others: (i) highly customizable security services based on
the needs of the end-users, (ii) fast reaction to new security
threats or variations of known attacks, and (iii) low Operating
Expenditure (OpEx) and Capital Expenditure (CapEx) for the
operator. On the other hand, compared to specialized HAs,
VSNFs may have a significant impact on the performance
of the network and on the Quality of Service (QoS) level
experienced by the users. The virtualization overhead, the
utilization level of the servers and the techniques adopted to
implement the VSNFs are the most significant contributors to
the QoS degradation.
We argue that, for a wide adoption of NSC and NFV
technologies in network security, the provisioning strategies
should take into account not only the security requirements,
but also specific QoS needs of applications (a list of common
classes of applications is provided in Table I with their
corresponding security and QoS requirements). Omitting the
latter may lead, for instance, to a model that blindly forces
all the user traffic to traverse the whole chain of VSNFs.
As a result, computationally demanding VSNFs such as IPSs
may cause a noticeable performance degradation to latency-
sensitive applications (e.g. online games [5]) or bandwidth
sensitive applications (e.g. video streaming). On the other
hand, beyond the overall resource consumption and QoS re-
quirements, the model must also take into account the specific
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TABLE I
SECURITY AND QOS REQUIREMENTS OF APPLICATIONS.
Application class Description Related threats Relevant VSNF 1 QoS requirements
CCTV systems
Closed Circuit TV
for video surveillance
accessible remotely
Port scanning, DDoS
password cracking
Firewall, DPI,
IDS, IPS
Bandwidth: 10Mbps
(5 cameras, 720p, 15fps,
H.264, medium quality)
Latency: 200ms (PTZ2
two-way latency [2])
Email Electronic mail Malware, spam, phishing, data exfiltration DPI, Antispam, IDS, DLP –
Instant messaging Real-time text-based Internet chat Malware, DDoS, phishing (out-of-band) DPI, Antispam, IDS, IPS –
Media streaming Audio/video content
accessed over the Internet
Inappropriate content Parental control
Bandwidth3: 5Mbps (HD)
25Mbps (UHD)
Remote storage File transfer over the network Data exfiltration VPN, Data Encryption Bandwidth
Network services
(DNS, VoD, file
sharing, WWW, SSH)
Server application
accessed by remote
client applications
DDoS, SQL injection,
remote code execution
Firewall, IDS,
WAF, Honeypot
–
Online gaming Video games played
over the Internet
Online game cheating (out-of-band attacks)
DDoS (in-band attacks)
DPI, Antispam,
IDS, IPS
Latency: 100ms
(first-person games [3])
Peer-to-peer File sharing over peer-to-peer networks DDoS, malware DPI, IDS, IPS –
Video conferencing Real-time audio/video over the Internet DDoS Firewall, IPS Latency: 150ms [4]
Web browsing Applications for browsing
the World Wide Web
Cross-site scripting, phishing,
malware, inappropriate content
DPI, WAF,
Parental control
Latency: 400ms [4]
1Acronyms of VSNFs: Deep Packet Inspection (DPI), Intrusion Detection System (IDS), Intrusion Prevention System (IPS), Data Loss/Leakage Prevention (DLP), Virtual Private
Network (VPN), Web Application Firewall (WAF). 2PTZ: Pan, Tilt, Zoom. 3Netflix Internet connection speed recommendations.
security best practices and policies. Omitting such aspects may
result in the inappropriate placement of a firewall in the middle
of the network, thus allowing unauthorized traffic to reach
hosts that should be protected.
In this paper, we present PESS (Progressive Embedding
of Security Services), a novel approach to provision security
services by composing chains of VSNFs according to the
specific QoS needs of user applications and the security
policies defined by the TSP. TSP’s security policies (given as
an input to PESS) include: the kind of VSNFs (e.g., firewall,
IPS, etc.) that should be deployed for a specific class of
applications, their order (e.g., firewall first, then IPS, etc.),
and more (e.g., a parental control should be installed close to
the user’s premises).
PESS defines an Integer Linear Programming (ILP) formu-
lation and a heuristic algorithm to tackle the provisioning prob-
lem in dynamic network scenarios, where the service requests
are not known in advance. In contrast, advance knowledge
of service requests is assumed by the majority of related
works. Although the PESS formulation and implementation
presented in this paper focus on security-specific services, the
proposed approach is also suitable for more complex scenarios,
where heterogeneous network services provided by means
of generic VNFs coexist (e.g., security, video broadcasting,
content caching, etc.).
To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first at-
tempt to tackle the challenges of progressively provisioning
application-aware security services onto operational infrastruc-
tures, in which the QoS performance of existing services may
be compromised by adding new services.
A preliminary ILP formulation of our application-aware
approach has been introduced in [6]. This work extends [6]
with the following contributions:
• A taxonomy of the most relevant VSNFs along with a list
of popular implementations available in the open-source
community and in today’s market.
• A mathematical formulation for the progressive provi-
sioning of security services (the PESS ILP model). With
respect to the ILP model presented in [6], this work
formulates the estimation of the processing delay based
on residual computing resources of the physical nodes,
and it formalizes the impact on the end-to-end latency of
operational services when allocating computing resources
for new requests.
• A heuristic algorithm, called PESS heuristic, to obtain
near-optimal solutions of the embedding problem in an
acceptable time frame (in the order of a few milliseconds
even in large network scenarios).
• An evaluation of the heuristic’s performance in terms
of quality of the solutions (deviation from optimality)
and scalability performed on real-world and randomly
generated topologies.
• Comparison of the proposed application-aware approach
against the baseline approach, in which security services
are provided without taking into account the specific
requirements of applications.
Our simulations prove that the PESS solution can deploy
more security services over the same infrastructure compared
to an application-agnostic approach (the baseline), while still
respecting the security policies and best practices defined by
the TSP. With PESS, each traffic flow generated by each
application can be served by the strict subset of VSNFs that
are necessary to ensure its security, which means that no flow
is burdened with any unnecessary security function that could
affect its smooth execution, as would be the case with an
application-agnostic approach. Of course, the capability of the
VSNFs to properly react to any security attack depends on the
specific implementation of the VSNF itself and is beyond the
scope of this work.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section
II reviews and discusses the related work. Section III gives the
relevant background information. Section IV provides the mo-
tivation behind this work. Section V details the mathematical
formulation of the ILP model, while Section VI describes the
heuristic algorithm that we implemented to solve the problem.
In Section VII, the heuristic algorithm is evaluated on real-
world and random topologies. Finally, the conclusions are
provided in Section VIII.
II. RELATED WORK
With the recent “softwarisation” of network resources, a
plethora of research initiatives has emerged in the last few
years to address the problem of the optimal placement of
chained VNFs. Most of these tackle the problem by using
linear programming techniques and by proposing heuristic
algorithms to cope with large scale problems. In this section,
we classify and review the most relevant works for our studies.
A. QoS-driven VNF Placement
QoS-driven approaches primarily focus on the QoS re-
quirements of specific services without considering network
security aspects. In this regard, the proposed mathematical
models include bandwidth and latency constraints (similar to
Constraints (10) and (12) presented in Section V) or define
objective functions that require minimization of the total
bandwidth and latency of created chains.
The ILP model in [7] considers computing and bandwidth
constraints to minimize the costs related to (i) VNF deploy-
ment, (ii) energy consumption of the servers, and (iii) forward-
ing traffic. The end-to-end delay requirement is formulated as
a penalty in the objective function. However, the computation
of the end-to-end delay only considers link propagation delays
without including the processing delay introduced at each
VNF. In [8], the placement problem is formulated as a Mixed
Integer Quadratically Constrained Problem with respect to
bandwidth, number of used nodes and latency. The processing
delay at each VNF is also not considered in this work. The
study in [9] proposes an ILP formulation and a heuristic
algorithm for the VNF placement problem focusing on QoS
parameters such as end-to-end delay and NSC availability.
The ILP model formulation presented in the paper does not
discuss how the processing delay introduced by the VNFs is
computed. This limitation is reflected in the assumptions made
for the evaluation, where the processing delay is considered
independent from the VNF type/implementation and from the
computing capacity of the physical node where VNFs are
placed. In [10], Tajiki et al. present a resource allocation
architecture for softwarized networks. The proposed architec-
ture includes two resource allocation modules whose goal is
configuring the network while satisfying QoS constraints and
optimizing the energy consumption and the number of flow
entries in the network. Although the authors tackle the prob-
lem of progressively allocating resources for newly arrived
flows, neither the ILP formulation nor the heuristic algorithm
consider the effects of the resource allocation on servers whose
computing capacity is close to the limit. As discussed in
Sections V-B and VI, this may lead to a degradation of the
QoS of existing services in terms of higher end-to-end latency.
B. Placement of VNFs/VSNFs
In addition to the research work on QoS-driven VNFs
placement, there are a number of works that specifically
consider the placement of VSNFs.
The method proposed in [11] is based on light-weight,
protocol-specific intrusion detection VNFs. The system dy-
namically invokes a chain of these IDSs according to the traffic
characteristics. The placement of the chains is based on a user-
defined or common shortest-path algorithm such as Dijkstra,
without consideration of the application QoS requirements or
available network/computing resources.
In [12], the authors argue that reactive mechanisms used by
cloud providers to deploy VSNFs do not ensure an optimal re-
source allocation. To address this, the authors propose a novel
resource allocation scheme, which estimates the behaviour of
the traffic load by monitoring the history of the current VSNFs,
and pro-actively provisions new instances of those VSNFs
as a countermeasure to any incoming resource pressure. The
proposed algorithm does not tackle the problem of VSNF
chaining. Instead, it focuses on the optimal placement of new
instances of VSNFs, which are part of existing chains. It also
assumes infinite network and computing resources.
In [13], Dermici et al. tackle the VSNFs placement problem
by proposing an ILP formulation whose objective is the min-
imization of the energy consumption of servers. This solution
does not consider any security nor QoS constraints. The aim
of the NSC embedding model presented in [14] is to minimize
the end-to-end latency of cross-domain chains of VSNFs. The
main limitation of the proposed ILP formulation is that it
only considers link propagation delays, while ignoring the
processing delay introduced at each VSNF.
C. Security-driven VSNF Placement
Although the literature reviewed in Section II-B addresses
the placement of VSNFs, few solutions have been proposed
with a focus on the network security requirements of the VSNF
placement. In [15], the authors propose a model for the place-
ment of VSNFs that takes into account security deployment
constraints. Such constraints are necessary to avoid incorrect
deployment of security functions such as placing an IDS on
an encrypted channel. The authors propose an ILP formulation
of the problem and validate their model by measuring the
execution time in four different scenarios and by comparing
the model with other heuristics in terms of placement cost.
However, the proposed optimization algorithm is always com-
puted for all flows in the network. Therefore, it does not scale
well. The authors mitigate the problem by partitioning the
network into independent blocks. Nevertheless, the partition-
ing scheme is limited to fat-tree topologies. Furthermore, the
end-to-end latency is not considered among the constraints of
the proposed model, which limits its application space. The
authors of [16] propose an ILP formulation and a heuristic
algorithm for efficiently composing chains of virtual security
TABLE II
TAXONOMY OF SECURITY VNFS.
VNF Description Use in security Implementations
Antispam Email filtering Malware detection, Phishing prevention SpamAssassin, rspamd, ASSP, Juniper vSRX
Antivirus Email/Web scanning/Endpoint security Virus/Trojan/Malware detection ClamAV, ClamWin, Juniper vSRX
DLP Data Loss/Leakage Prevention Data exfiltration detection myDLP, OpenDLP
DPI Payload analysis Spam Filtering, Intrusion detection, DDoS
detection, Malware detection, Security Analytics
OpenDPI, nDPI, L7-filter, Libprotoident,
PACE, NBAR, Cisco ASAv
Honeypot Traffic redirection and inspection Spam filtering, Malware detection,
SQL database protection, Security Analytics
HoneyD, SpamD, Kippo,
Kojoney, Dionaea, Glastopf
IDS Traffic inspection
(header and payload)
Intrusion detection, Malware detection,
DDoS detection, Security Analytics
Snort, Bro, Suricata, ACARM-ng, AIDE,
OSSEC, Samhain, Cuckoo, Cisco ASAv
IPS Traffic filtering based on
header and payload
Intrusion prevention,
DDoS prevention
Snort, Suricata, ACARM-ng,
Fail2Ban, Juniper vSRX
NAT1 IP address mapping Intrusion prevention Netfilter, IPFilter, PF
Packet Filter Firewall Header-based packet filtering Intrusion prevention Netfilter, nftables, NuFW, IPFilter, ipfw, PF,
Juniper vSRX, VMWare vShield, Fortigate FW
Parental Control Media content filtering Blocking access to
inappropriate content
OpenDNS, SquidGuard,
DansGuardian, pfsense
VPN Gateway Site-to-site VPN connection
over unsecured networks
Data Tunneling/Encryption
OpenVPN, strongSwan, Juniper vSRX,
Cisco ASAv, Fortigate VPN
WAF HTTP traffic monitoring, filtering, logging Prevention of SQL injection, cross-site scripting ModSecurity
1 NAT is not a security function but inherently provides packet filtering similar to a firewall.
functions. The ILP formulation includes a single security-
related constraint to ensure that the security level of each
deployed VSNF instance is higher than the security level
required by the service request. However, this work does not
take into account basic security aspects, such as order and
operational mode (stateful/stateless) of the chained VSNFs.
Moreover, the proposed formulation does not consider the
mutual interference between security services caused by the
concurrent access to the (finite) computing resources available
in the infrastructure. The latter aspect is particularly relevant
in a TSP scenario (see also part II of [17]), where the security
services are provisioned in a dynamic manner based on the
incoming customers’ requests.
III. BACKGROUND
This work is underpinned by two emerging network
technologies; Network Function Virtualization (NFV) and
Software-Defined Networking (SDN) and their integration to
provision network security solutions.
A. Network Function Virtualization
Today’s network functions such as firewalling, DPI, IDSs,
etc. are provided by specialized proprietary hardware appli-
ances (also called middleboxes) strategically deployed in the
network. The NFV paradigm separates the network functions
from the underlying hardware by moving the functions from
specialized devices to off-the-shelf commodity equipment such
as industry standard servers or high-performance network
devices. Therefore, network services can be decomposed into
multiple VNFs running on physical or virtual machines, which
could be located in data centers, network nodes or at the end-
user premises.
In contrast to middleboxes, the configuration of which
requires intensive and time-consuming manual intervention,
NFV allows an automated and flexible deployment of network
functions on any NFV-enabled device. The lifecycle manage-
ment of VNFs and hardware resources is achieved through a
centralized software component called the Orchestrator.
B. Software-Defined Networking
SDN is often referred to as a paradigm for network environ-
ments where the control plane is physically separated from the
data plane and a logically centralized control plane controls
several devices. This differs from traditional networks in which
nodes are autonomous systems unaware of the overall state of
the network. In SDN deployments, the nodes are remotely
controlled via standard protocols (e.g. OpenFlow [18]) by
a logically centralized intelligent module called the SDN
controller, which bases routing decisions on a global (domain)
view of the network.
The controller is a software component which runs on com-
modity hardware appliances and provides an open Application
Programming Interface (API) to program the network for
configuration, monitoring and troubleshooting purposes. Such
programmability enables automated and dynamic network
configurability and fine-grained control of the traffic based on
the values of the packets’ header fields (e.g., source/destination
IP/MAC addresses, VLAN tags, TCP/UDP ports, etc.).
C. Service Function Chaining
Service Function Chaining (also known as Network Service
Chaining) is a technique for selecting and steering data traffic
flows through network services. The network services can be
traffic management applications such as load balancing, or
security applications such as those detailed in Section III-D.
Service function chaining combines the capabilities of SDN
and NFV to connect a distributed set of VNFs.
D. A Taxonomy of security VNFs
As introduced in Section III-A, a VNF is a software
implementation of a network function which is deployed on a
virtual resource such as a Virtual Machine. Table II provides
a list of the most common security functions. Traditionally,
the majority of these functions would have been implemented
on dedicated hardware (middleboxes) to process the network
traffic along the data path. Today, these functions are deployed
as VNFs. Table II includes a short description of each VNF and
some of the publicly available open-source implementations or
commercial products.
IV. MOTIVATION
We motivate our work by describing two use case scenarios,
namely web browsing and online gaming, where the TSP
exploits the NSC and NFV technologies to provide security
services tailored to specific users’ application requirements.
Web browsing. Parental control is applied to Web traffic
to block unwanted media and social-media content, while an
IDS might be used to intercept malicious software (malware).
Stateful VSNFs provide security functionality by tracking the
state of network connections (e.g. Layer 4 firewall, NAT). In
this case, the same VSNF instance must be traversed by all
traffic flows of a network conversation in order to maintain
the correct state of the connection. More flexible provisioning
schemes can be adopted for stateless VSNFs, where multiple
instances of the same VSNF might be deployed on different
servers for load balancing. This example also illustrates the se-
curity best-practice that unwanted traffic should be blocked as
soon as it enters the network by placing firewalls and IDS/IPS
close to the border of the TSP domain. Another generally
accepted practice, is to place firewalls before IDS/IPS (from
the point of view of incoming traffic). Firewalls are generally
designed to drop unauthorized traffic very quickly, thus reduc-
ing the burden on IDS/IPS, which are more computationally
expensive.
Online gaming. An IDS might also be used to detect
possible threats due to the misuse of chat tools integrated
within the gaming software (e.g., phishing [19], social
engineering [20], etc.). As the communication between the
client and the server relies on timely delivery of packets,
IDS operations are not executed on the in-game traffic. In
this case the security is enforced by a faster VSNF such
as a Firewall, which checks the packet headers without any
deep-payload analysis. It should be noted that web traffic
and chat conversations are often encrypted by TLS/SSL
cryptographic protocols. Although encryption preserves the
confidentiality of the traffic, it also prevents IDS-based
VSNFs such as Parental Control and IDS from inspecting the
packets, thus allowing an attacker to obfuscate malicious data
in encrypted payloads. However, the TSP could overcome
this limitation either using a Transparent Proxy VSNF or by
exploiting recent advances in network security [21], [22].
These are just two examples of how the security service
can be tailored to the user’s application requirements by
appropriate selection and placement of VSNFs. A list of
common classes of applications supported in the TSP use-
case is provided in Table I with their corresponding security
and QoS requirements and relevant VSNFs. One of them, the
remotely accessible CCTV system, will be used in the rest of
this paper as a running example to illustrate various aspects
of our work.
According to the motivations provided above, we can sum-
marize the rationale behind the PESS approach as follows:
(i) a user’s application should never under-perform because
of VSNF operations and (ii) the VSNF placement must obey
the TSP’s security best-practices in terms of application secu-
rity requirements, position in the network, operational mode
(stateless or stateful VSNF), and order with respect to the
direction of the traffic. In the next section, we present the
PESS mathematical model for the placement of VSNF chains
based on these criteria.
V. PESS VSNF PLACEMENT MODEL
The PESS model (Fig. 1) is a mathematical model to
progressively embed service requests, formed by one or mul-
tiple VSNF chains, onto a physical network substrate by
considering the available resources and realistic constraints.
PESS
Current Resources
Security service 
request
TSP Security policies
Position of VSNFs
Physical path for 
each chain
Updated resourcesConstraints
Fig. 1. PESS placement model workflow.
PESS takes as input a model of the physical network includ-
ing the current status of computing and network resources of
servers and links, a security service request and the TSP’s
security policies (expressed in the form of constraints for
PESS). The output of PESS is the mapping of the VSNFs
onto the physical network (position of the VSNFs and one
or more paths between them) and an updated model of the
physical network taking into account the resources used to
provision the service. The updated model is used as input for
the next request.
Physical network model. We represent the physical net-
work as a weighted graph G = (N,E), i.e. a graph where
weights are assigned to nodes and edges.
Without loss of generality and to simplify the model, we
assume that every node i ∈ N is a NFVI-POP (Network
Function Virtualization Infrastructure Point of Presence) [23]
consisting of a set of servers and a local network composed of
routers and switches. Each node i is characterized by the total
computing resources of the servers γi ∈ N+ expressed in CPU
cycles/sec. A link (k, l) ∈ E is a wired connection between
two nodes k and l ∈ N . It is characterized by its capacity
βk,l ∈ N+ and its propagation delay λk,l ∈ N+. Both are
expressed as positive integer numbers representing bandwidth
(bits/sec) and latency (sec).
Regions in a physical network are defined as subsets of
nodes sharing some high-level features. Examples of regions
are: (i) a set of nodes in the TSP network providing the same
cloud service (e.g. multimedia caching, data storage, etc.), or
(ii) the set of egress nodes that connect the TSP network to
the Internet (called border region in the rest of this paper).
Security service request. We model a security service
request as a set of independent weighted directed graphs:
Gs = {(U c, U cpairs) : c ∈ Cs}
where Cs is the set of unidirectional chains composing the
service request. Each graph includes nodes and arcs. Nodes
U c = Ac ∪ V c comprise user and remote applications (Ac,
the endpoints of chain c) as well as a subset of all VSNFs
(V c). Each arc in U cpairs delineates the order of traversing the
VSNFs ∈ V c between endpoints in Ac.
Each chain c ∈ Cs is characterized by its requirements in
terms of minimum bandwidth βc and maximum latency λc.
Each endpoint in Ac is characterized by an identifier, which
specifies where the endpoint must be placed in the physical
network. The user application is characterized by the identifier
of the physical node to which the user is attached (called ep1 in
the rest of the paper). A remote application is characterized by
the identifier of a region in the physical network (called EP2).
For instance, the border region if the endpoint represents a
remote gaming server located outside the physical network. In
this paper, ep1 and EP2 are referred to as physical endpoints
of the service request Gs.
A VSNF u ∈ V c is characterized by its requirements in
terms of CPU units γu expressed in CPU cycles/bit. u is also
characterized by the latency λci,u it introduces in the dataplane
to process a packet of chain c on node i. As formalized in
Eq. (13), this latency is a function of the residual computing
capacity of the node i where u is placed, the computing
requirements γu of the VSNF, the average packet size σc of
chain c and the traffic load of the chain (whose upper bound is
βc). Finally, a VSNF is characterized by its operational mode
(either stateless or stateful) and by the identifier of a region
in the physical network where it must be placed, if required
by the TSP security policies.
Illustrative example. An example of a security service
request for a CCTV system (see Table I) is represented in
Fig. 2. The request in the example is composed of three chains
(c1, c2, and c3), each one identified by the type of traffic and
its direction.
CCTV
FW
(γ2)
IPS
(γ1)
Remote
Access
βc1, λc1 βc1, λc1
βc2, λc2 βc2, λc2
βc2, λc2
βc3, λc3
βc3, λc3βc3, λc3
Video Stream
Camera Mgmt/Controls
Fig. 2. Example of security service request for the CCTV system.
Chain c1 is applied to the live video stream captured
by the cameras and accessible over the Internet. The chain
comprises a L3 firewall to ensure that the stream is only
transmitted to authorized endpoints. As specified in Table I,
the most relevant requirement in this case is the bandwidth
(βc1) which depends on the frame rate, frame size and video
codec of the CCTV system. In this case, a deep inspection
of the video stream packets (e.g., with an IPS) would not
provide any additional protection but would possibly reduce
the frame rate of the video streaming, thus compromising the
detection of anomalous events. On the other hand, the bi-
directional control/management traffic is inspected by the IPS
and the firewall included in chains c2 and c3. Such VSNFs
protect the CCTV system from attacks such as Mirai [24]
perpetrated through bots maliciously installed on Internet-
connected devices, while the latency requirements λc2 and
λc3 guarantee the responsiveness of the remote control of the
CCTV cameras (pan, tilt, zoom, etc.).
A. ILP formulation
Definitions. Let us first define two binary variables:
• xci,u = 1 iff node u ∈ U c is mapped to i ∈ N .
• yck,l,i,j,u,v = 1 iff physical link (k, l) ∈ E belongs to
the path between nodes i and j to which u, v ∈ U c are
mapped.
The residual capacity of a link, β′k,l, is defined as the total
amount of bandwidth available on link (k, l) ∈ E:
β′k,l = βk,l −
∑
c∈C, i,j∈N
(u,v)∈Ucpairs
βc · yck,l,i,j,u,v (1)
thus, it is the nominal capacity of link (k, l) minus the
bandwidth required by the chains c ∈ C already mapped on
that link.
Similarly, the residual capacity of a node is defined as its
nominal CPU capacity minus the computing resources used
by the VSNFs v instantiated on the node:
γ′i = γi −
∑
{c∈C,u∈V c} γ
c
u · xci,u (2)
Problem formulation. Given a physical network G, for
each security service request Gs, find a suitable mapping of
all its unidirectional chains on the physical network, which
minimizes the physical resources of G expended to map Gs,
also known as the embedding cost.
Hence, the solution of the problem is represented by a set of
xci,u and y
c
k,l,i,j,u,v such that the cumulative usage of physical
resources for all the chains in Gs is minimized:
min
∑
c∈Cs, i,j∈N,
(k,l)∈E,(u,v)∈Ucpairs
bk,l · βc · yck,l,i,j,u,v + α
∑
c∈Cs,i∈N,u∈V c
ci · γcu · xci,u (3)
Here, α is a factor that can be used to tune the relative
weight of the cost components (we have used α = 1 for the
experiments described in Section VII).
bk,l and ci are the costs for allocating bandwidth and CPU:
bk,l =
1
β′k,l + δ
ci =
1
γ′i + δ
They penalize nodes and links with less residual capacity
with the aim to increase the chances of accommodating
more security service requests on the given physical network.
δ −→ 0 is a small positive constant used to avoid dividing by
zero in computing the value of the function.
B. Constraints
Routing Constraint (4) ensures that each node u ∈ U c is
mapped to exactly one physical node i ∈ N . With Constraint
(5), a physical link (k, l) can belong to a path between two
nodes i and j for an arc (u, v) ∈ U cpairs of chain c ∈ Cs
only if u and v are mapped to these nodes. Constraint (6)
ensures that the path created for arc (u, v) starts at exactly one
edge extending from node i to where VSNF (or start/endpoint)
u is mapped. Similarly, (7) ensures the correctness and the
uniqueness of the final edges in the path. Constraints (5-7)
can be easily linearized with standard techniques such as the
ones presented in [25]. Constraint (8) is the classical flow
conservation constraint. That is, an outbound flow equals
an inbound flow for each intermediate node l (intermediate
nodes cannot consume the flow). Together with Constraint
(8), Constraint (9) prevents multiple incoming/outgoing links
carrying traffic for a specific flow in the intermediate node l,
i.e., we only consider unsplittable flows.∑
{i∈N} x
c
i,u = 1 ∀c ∈ Cs,∀u ∈ U c (4)
yck,l,i,j,u,v ≤ xci,u · xcj,v
∀c ∈ Cs,∀i, j ∈ N, ∀(u, v) ∈ U cpairs,∀(k, l) ∈ E
(5)
∑
{(i,k)∈E,j∈N} y
c
i,k,i,j,u,v · xci,u · xcj,v = 1
∀c ∈ Cs,∀(u, v) ∈ U cpairs
(6)
∑
{(k,j)∈E,i∈N} y
c
k,j,i,j,u,v · xci,u · xcj,v = 1
∀c ∈ Cs,∀(u, v) ∈ U cpairs
(7)
∑
k∈N
(k,l)∈E
yck,l,i,j,u,v =
∑
m∈N
(l,m)∈E
ycl,m,i,j,u,v (8)
∀c ∈ Cs,∀i, j ∈ N, ∀l ∈ N, l 6= i, l 6= j,∀(u, v) ∈ U cpairs∑
k∈N
(k,l)∈E
yck,l,i,j,u,v ≤ 1 (9)
∀c ∈ Cs,∀i, j ∈ N, ∀l ∈ N, l 6= i, l 6= j,∀(u, v) ∈ U cpairs
Resource Constraints (10-11) ensure that the resources
consumed by a security service do not exceed the available
bandwidth and computing capacities.∑
c∈Cs, i,j∈N
(u,v)∈Ucpairs
yck,l,i,j,u,v · βc ≤ β′k,l ∀(k, l) ∈ E
(10)
∑
{c∈Cs,u∈V c} x
c
i,u · γcu ≤ γ′i ∀i ∈ N (11)
QoS Constraint (12) verifies that the requirements in terms
of maximum end-to-end latency are met. It takes into consid-
eration the propagation delay of physical links, the processing
TABLE III
GLOSSARY OF SYMBOLS.
Sets
N Set of physical nodes
E Set of physical links
C Set of all unidirectional chains already embedded in the network
Cs Set of all unidirectional chains in the service request Gs
Uc Set of virtual nodes in the chain c
Ucpairs Set of unidirectional arcs in the chain c
Ac Set of endpoints of the chain c. Ac ⊂ Uc
V c Set of VSNFs in the chain c. V c ⊂ Uc
Ru Region of N where VSNF u must be placed (region constraint)
M Region of N where no VSNFs can be placed (veto constraint)
ep1, EP2 Physical endpoints of a service request. ep1 ∈ N,EP2 ⊂ N
Parameters
γi Nominal computing resources of node i (CPU cycles/sec)
γ′i Residual computing resources of node i (CPU cycles/sec)
γu
CPU cycles required by u to process one bit of a network packet
(CPU cycles/bit)
γcu
Computing resources required by node u of chain c (CPU
cycles/sec). γcu = γu · βc
βk,l Nominal capacity of link (k, l) (bits/sec)
β′k,l Residual capacity of link (k, l) (bits/sec)
βc Minimum bandwidth required by chain c (bits/sec)
λk,l
Propagation delay: the time spent by a packet to traverse the link
(k, l) (secs)
λck,l,i,j
Queuing delay: time spent by a packet of chain c to traverse the
network devices (routers and switches) in the local networks of
adjacent nodes k and l (secs). λck,l,i,j > 0 iff k = i or l = j.
λci,u
Processing delay: the time spent by a packet to traverse VSNF u of
chain c placed on node i (secs)
λc Maximum latency tolerated by chain c (secs)
pic
Estimated latency between the TSP network and the remote endpoint
of chain c (secs). pic = 0 if the endpoint belongs to the TSP network.
σc Average packet size of chain c (bits).
bk,l Cost for allocating a unit of bandwidth on link (k,l)
ci Cost for allocating a unit of CPU on node i
Decision variables
xci,u
Binary variable such that xci,u = 1 iff node u ∈ Uc is mapped
to i ∈ N
yck,l,i,j,u,v
Binary variable such that yck,l,i,j,u,v = 1 iff physical link
(k, l) ∈ E belongs to the path between nodes i and j to which
u, v ∈ Uc are mapped
delay of VSNFs and the queuing delay through network
devices. Note that the minimum bandwidth requirement is
verified against the bandwidth resource Constraint (10).
pic +
∑
i∈N,u∈V c
xci,u · λci,u +
∑
i,j∈N,(k,l)∈E
(u,v)∈Ucpairs
yck,l,i,j,u,v · (λk,l + λck,l,i,j) ≤ λc
∀c ∈ Cs (12)
pic is an estimation of the propagation delay between the
TSP network and the remote endpoint of chain c, in case the
endpoint is outside the TSP network. We assume that this value
is independent from the TSP’s network egress node. Clearly
pic is 0 for those chains whose remote endpoint is part of the
TSP network (e.g., a cloud data center managed by the TSP).
The processing delay λci,u is the time spent by a packet
to traverse VSNF u on physical node i. It contributes to the
overall end-to-end delay of chain c only if VSNF u is placed
on node i (i.e., xci,u = 1). λ
c
i,u includes the time taken by the
VSNF to process the packet and the overhead of the virtual-
ization technology (VMware, KVM, QEMU virtual machines,
Docker containers, etc.). For simplicity, we do not model the
delays due to the CPU scheduler operations implemented on
the physical node [26]. Based on the observations in [27], [28],
[29], λci,u is modeled as a convex function of the traffic load of
the chain, and its value is computed by considering the impact
of other VSNFs co-located on the same physical node.
λci,u =
γu · σc
(γ′i − γu · βc) + δ
=
γu · σc
(γ′i − γcu) + δ
(13)
In Eq. (13), γu · σc is the average amount of CPU cycles
used by VSNF u to process a packet of chain c (virtualization
overhead included). The latency overhead caused by co-
located VSNFs depends on the amount of computing resources
of the node they use or, equivalently, on the residual computing
resources of the node γ′i. γu · βc = γcu is the amount of CPU
cycles/sec used by VSNF u on node i, which depends on the
traffic load of the chain. δ is a small positive constant used
to avoid dividing by zero in the case that u consumes all the
residual computing resources of node i.
The sum λk,l + λck,l,i,j in Eq. (12) is the total time spent
by a packet travelling between two adjacent nodes k and l.
It includes the propagation delay λk,l, proportional to the
distance between k and l, and the queuing delay λck,l,i,j ,
proportional to the number of network devices (switches and
routers) the packet traverses within the local networks of k
and l. The queuing delay is influenced by the buffer size of
network devices’ ports and by the traffic load [30]. For the
sake of simplicity, we assume that the buffers are correctly
dimensioned, i.e. no dropped packets due to buffer overflow. In
addition, we estimate the queuing delay λck,l,i,j as a traffic-load
independent value; a function of the maximum queue capacity
of the ports and of the VSNFs placement (hence a function of
indices k, l, i and j). Specifically, λck,l,i,j > 0 if at least one
VSNF is mapped either on k (k = i), or on l (l = j), meaning
that a packet of chain c must traverse the local network of
either k, or l (or both) to reach the VSNFs running on the
nodes’ servers. Otherwise, the local networks of k and l are
by-passed by the traffic of c, resulting in λck,l,i,j = 0.
Constraint (14) ensures that the current security service Gs
does not compromise the end-to-end latency of chains cˆ ∈ C
in operational security services (also called operational chains
in the rest of the paper).
picˆ +
∑
i∈N,uˆ∈V cˆ
x¯cˆi,uˆ · λcˆi,uˆ +
∑
i,j∈N,(k,l)∈E
(uˆ,vˆ)∈U cˆpairs
y¯cˆk,l,i,j,uˆ,vˆ · (λk,l + λcˆk,l,i,j) ≤ λcˆ
∀cˆ ∈ C (14)
In Eq. (14), x¯cˆ and y¯cˆ are the values of decision variables
x and y computed for the placement of chain cˆ. λcˆi,uˆ is the
updated value of the processing delay introduced to the traffic
of chain cˆ by VSNF uˆ when running on node i.
λcˆi,uˆ =
γuˆ · σcˆ
(γ′i −
∑
{c∈Cs,u∈V c} x
c
i,u · γcu) + δ
(15)
In Eq. (15), the value of λcˆi,uˆ is updated by considering the
computing resources consumed on node i by VSNFs of the
security service request Gs. Approximation of Eq. (15) can
be achieved by using piecewise linearization techniques and
Special-Ordered Set (SOS) variables and constraints available
in most commercial solvers (e.g., [31]).
Security constraints ensure that the TSP’s security policies
are applied. Specifically, Constraint (16) forces a subset C ′s of
the chains in the request to share the same VSNF instance in
case of stateful flow processing.
xc1u,i = x
c2
u,i ∀c1, c2 ∈ C ′s ⊂ Cs, i ∈ N, u ∈ V c (16)
Constraint (17) forces the algorithm to place the VSNF u ∈
V c in a specific region of the network defined as a subset of
nodes Ru ⊂ N .∑
{i∈Ru} x
c
i,u = 1 Ru ⊂ N,Ru 6= ∅, u ∈ V c (17)
We use Constraint (17) to enforce the security close to the
user by placing VSNFs on ep1 (Ru = {ep1}), or to protect
a portion of the TSP’s network, such as the border region or
a distributed data center (Ru = EP2) from potentially ma-
licious user traffic. Furthermore, Constraint (17) can be used
to place a VSNF on a physical node with special hardware
characteristics (e.g., hardware acceleration for encryption).
Similarly, the veto Constraint (18) can be used to prevent the
placement of any VSNFs on a pre-defined subset of nodes
M ⊂ N . A TSP may choose to do this to protect specific
nodes (called veto nodes) that host sensitive data or critical
functions from user traffic.∑
{i∈M,u∈V c} x
c
i,u = 0 ∀c ∈ Cs,M ⊂ N,M 6= ∅ (18)
Finally, for each chain c ∈ Cs, the correct order of VSNFs
in V c is ensured by Constraints (4-9), plus Constraint (17)
applied to user and remote applications u ∈ Ac with Ru =
{ep1} and Ru = EP2 respectively. Note that, the order can
be specified per application (chain), as different applications
may require the same VSNFs but in different order.
These four security constraints enable fulfillment of the
security policies/practices defined by the TSP e.g. the order
in which the VSNFs are executed, the position of the VSNFs
in the network, and the operational mode of VSNFs (either
stateful or stateless).
VI. THE PESS HEURISTIC ALGORITHM
The embedding problem presented in Section V has been
solved using a commercial solver. However, given the com-
plexity of the ILP model, the solver is unable to produce
solutions in an acceptable time frame, as required for dynamic
scenarios such as the ones under study. For this reason, we
have also implemented a heuristic algorithm to find near
optimal solutions in much shorter time.
The logic behind the PESS heuristic is based on assuring
that Constraints (4-18) are applied in an efficient manner. In
particular, the security constraint (16) ensures that a stateful
VSNF specified in two or more chains in the same service
request Gs is placed on the same node. However, as different
chains might share more than one stateful VSNF (possibly in a
different order), the correct placement of a multi-chain security
service request may become a computationally expensive
operation. For this reason, given a path between ep1 and one
of the nodes ep2 ∈ EP2, the heuristic places all the VSNFs
specified in Gs on a maximum of three nodes of the path with
the following strategy: (i) place each region-specific VSNF
u ∈ V c (Ru 6= ∅) either on ep1 or on ep2 ∈ EP2 depending
on Ru (i.e., either Ru = {ep1} or Ru = EP2), (ii) place all
the other VSNFs in Gs on the node with the highest residual
capacity in the path to minimize the embedding cost (Eq. 3).
The solution is obtained by selecting the candidate path
between ep1 and EP2 where the embedding of all the chains
in Gs fulfills the constraints described in Section V at the
lowest cost, as computed with the objective function (Eq. 3).
Algorithm 1 the PESS algorithm.
Input: Physical network substrate (G), security service request (Gs), set of
active chains in the network (C)
Output: The mapping of the security service onto the physical substrate
(solution). None if no feasible mappings are found.
1: procedure PESS(G, Gs, C)
2: β¯ ←∑{c∈Cs} βc . total required bandwidth
3: γ¯ ←∑{c∈Cs,u∈V c} γcu . total required CPU
4: P = {p[ep1,ep] | ep ∈ EP2} ← DIJKSTRA(ep1, EP2, β¯)
5: if P = ∅ then
6: return None
7: end if
8: S = {s[ep1,ep] | ep ∈ EP2} ← EMBED(P, β¯, γ¯)
9: NS ← {i ∈ s | s ∈ S} . physical nodes in the initial solutions
10: E ← {i ∈ N | i /∈ NS ∪M, γ′i > γ′j ∀j ∈ NS}
11: s¯[ep1,ep2] ← argmin
s∈S
cost(s) . best initial solution
12: P1 ← DIJKSTRA(ep1, E, β¯)
13: P2 ← DIJKSTRA(ep2, E, β¯)
14: S ← S ∪ EMBED(P1 ∪ P2, β¯, γ¯) . expanded solution set
15: solution←None
16: S ← SORTEDDECREASINGCOST(S)
17: for all cs ∈ S do
18: if LATENCYOPCHAINS(G, C, cs) is True then
19: solution← cs
20: break
21: end if
22: end for
23: if solution is None then
24: return None
25: end if
26: UPDATERESOURCES(solution,G)
27: STORESOLUTION(G, C, solution)
28: return solution
29: end procedure
Initial solution. The embedding process starts at line 4 in
Algorithm 1 with a greedy approach based on the Dijkstra’s
algorithm. At this stage, we compute the shortest path tree
between the two endpoints ep1 and EP2 using the residual
bandwidth as link weight computed as bk,l ·βc in Eq. (3). The
Dijkstra algorithm stops when all the nodes ep2 ∈ EP2 are
marked as visited, i.e. before building the whole tree of paths.
For each path between ep1 and EP2, the algorithm places the
VSNFs in the chains according to the aforementioned strategy,
the order of the VSNFs as specified in the service request, the
latency Constraint (12), and the security Constraints (16-18)
(line 8). The output of this first step is a set of candidate
solutions S with different embedding costs. S is passed as
input to the next step.
Expanded solution set. The algorithm now evaluates
whether high-capacity nodes not included in the initial solution
set S can be used to build new solutions with lower embedding
cost. Hence, given the initial set of solutions S, the algorithm
identifies the physical nodes in the network with these two
properties (set E defined at line 10): (i) not included in
the initial set of solutions S nor veto nodes, and (ii) higher
computing capacity with respect to the nodes included in S.
The algorithm then computes the shortest path tree twice, once
from ep1 towards E and once from ep2 ∈ EP2 towards E
(lines 12-13), where {ep1, ep2} are the physical endpoints of
the solution in S with the lowest embedding cost (line 11).
The resulting subpaths are joined to form a new set of paths
between ep1 and ep2. Afterwards, the algorithm performs the
placement of the VSNFs on each of the new paths with the
strategy described earlier in this section. The feasible solutions
are added to the initial set S (line 14).
The set of candidate solutions is sorted in descending
value of embedding cost (line 16). The first one that satisfies
Constraint (14) is the accepted solution (lines 18-19). Finally,
the algorithm updates the values of γ′i and β
′
i by removing the
resources consumed with the accepted solution and stores the
mapping of its chains in the set C that records all the active
chains in the network (lines 26-27).
Latency of operational chains. Given a candidate solution
cs ∈ S, function LATENCYOPCHAINS is invoked to verify
whether embedding cs compromises the end-to-end latency
of operational chains (line 18 in Algorithm 1). Instead of
verifying the inequality in Eq. (14) for each operational chain,
LATENCYOPCHAINS implements a heuristic approach, which
reduces the time complexity of this operation from O(n), with
n the number of operational chains, to O(1).
Each time a chain c ∈ C becomes operational, the algorithm
computes 〈γ〉c, a threshold value obtained from Eq. (12) and
(13) as follows:
〈γ〉c =
∑
i∈N,u∈V c
x¯ci,u · γu · σc
λc − pic −∑
i,j∈N,(k,l)∈E
(u,v)∈Ucpairs
y¯ck,l,i,j,u,v · (λk,l + λck,l,i,j)
− δ (19)
In Eq. (19), x¯ and y¯ are the values of decision variables x
and y used to embed c. 〈γ〉c estimates the minimum average
residual computing capacity necessary to satisfy the inequality
in Eq. (12). Therefore, the algorithm records and monitors
those operational chains with the highest values of 〈γ〉c to
establish whether a candidate solution is feasible or not, as
inequality in Eq. (12) is violated earlier for such chains than
for the others.
The algorithm stores one operational chain per physical
node in a data structure, i.e. the chain with the highest value
of 〈γ〉c with at least one VSNF mapped on that node. Hence,
given the physical nodes mapped in the candidate solution
cs, the algorithm computes Eq. (14) only for the operational
chains in the data structure linked to such nodes by using the
values of variables x and y of solution cs. If the inequality is
not satisfied for one of those chains, cs is rejected.
As the maximum number of physical nodes used to pro-
vision a security service is three (ep1 and EP2 to fulfill
the region constraint and the node with the highest residual
capacity in the path), the worst-case time complexity of this
process is O(1), thus constant in the number of operational
chains and with respect to the size of the network. There-
fore, the overall time complexity of the PESS heuristic is
O(|E| + |N | log(|N |)), i.e., the worst-case time complexity
of the Dijkstra’s algorithm.
VII. EVALUATION
We first assess the PESS heuristic by comparing its solutions
against the optimal embeddings as computed by a commercial
solver (Gurobi [32]). We then prove the benefits of the
proposed application-aware approach against the baseline (the
application-agnostic approach adopted, for instance, in [15]),
in which security services are provided without taking into
account the specific requirements of applications. We finally
analyze the scalability of PESS by measuring the average
embedding time on different network sizes.
A. Test configuration
The PESS heuristic has been implemented as a single-
threaded Python program, while the ILP model formalized in
Section V has been implemented with the Gurobi Python API
version 7.5 [33]. All experiments are performed on a server-
class computer equipped with 2 Intel Xeon Silver 4110 CPUs
(16 cores each running at 2.1 GHz) and 64 GB of RAM.
1) Topology: The simulations are performed on synthetic
topologies randomly generated based on the Baraba´si-Albert
model [34]. We generate topologies of different sizes and
densities to evaluate the performance of the PESS heuristic
in a variety of generic network scenarios.
We also validate PESS with two realistic network models.
One is the Stanford University backbone [35], a medium-scale
campus network consisting of 46 links, 14 operational zone
routers, 10 Ethernet switches, and 2 border routers connecting
the University to the Internet. We assume one NFVI-POP for
each network device and 10 Gbps links. The second model
is the Italian education and research network (consortium
GARR [36]). The GARR network covers the entire Italian
national territory ([37]), comprising 83 links and 46 nodes.
Along with the actual view of the physical topology, [37]
provides the specification of the egress nodes, i.e. the nodes
that connect the GARR network to the Internet and that
compose the border region in our evaluation (nodes FI1, MI2,
PD2, RM2 and TO1, as indicated in [37]). As we have no
information related to data center distribution in the GARR
network, we have assumed one NFVI-POP for each node. In
addition, we set the nominal capacity of the links βk,l using
the values specified in [38].
Given the relatively small size of the Stanford network,
we assume no propagation delay between its nodes, i.e.
λk,l = 0 ∀k, l. For the other networks, random and GARR, we
compute the propagation delay of each link with the following
formula:
λk,l =
dk,l · r index
C
where r index = 1.5 is an approximation of the refractive
index of optical fibers, C ' 3 · 108 m/s is the speed of light
in the vacuum and dk,l is the distance between two nodes
k and l. In the case of random networks, dk,l is a random
positive value ranging from 10 to 100 Km, while for the GARR
TABLE IV
CPU REQUIREMENTS FOR SOME VSNF IMPLEMENTATIONS.
VSNF Virtualization
γu
(cycles/bit)1
Snort IDS/IPS VirtualBox 9.5 [39]
Suricata IDS/IPS VirtualBox 8.2 [39]
OpenVPN with AES-NI KVM/QEMU 31 [40]
strongSwan with AES-NI KVM/QEMU 16 [40]
Fortigate-VM NGFW FortiOS 9 [41]
Fortigate-VM SSL VPN FortiOS 13.6 [41]
Fortigate-VM IPSec VPN FortiOS 14.5 [41]
Fortigate-VM Threat protection FortiOS 11.3 [41]
Cisco ASAv Stateful IDS VMware ESX/ESXi 4.2 [42]
Cisco ASAv AES VPN VMware ESX/ESXi 6.9 [42]
Juniper vSRX FW VMware VMXNET3 2.3 [43]
Juniper vSRX IPS VMware VMXNET3 2.4 [43]
Juniper vSRX AppMonitor VMware VMXNET3 1.5 [43]
1 γu=(CPU clock)*(CPU usage)/Throughput. CPU usage is set to 1 (i.e. 100%)
when the value is not specified.
network dk,l is computed by approximating the coordinates of
the nodes based on the information available on the web site.
As introduced in Section V-B, we estimate the worst-case
queuing delay λck,l,i,j as a traffic-load independent value using
the queue capacity of switch ports reported in [30] (80µs for
10 Gbps ports with a 100 KB buffer). Specifically, we assume
a three-tier local network at each node of GARR and random
topologies, resulting in a maximum of 12 × 80µs queuing
delay introduced at each node. This reflects the maximum
queuing delay experienced by each packet crossing a node
to be processed by one or more VSNFs mapped on the node,
which involves traversing three network devices (hence, six
10 Gbps ports) to reach the servers where the VSNFs are
running, and traversing three network devices before leaving
the node (six further 10 Gbps ports).
For the campus scenario, implemented using the Stanford
University topology, we instead assume only one network
device per node; the device specified in the network topology.
Hence, the maximum queuing latency for a packet crossing a
Stanford node is 4× 80µs.
For each node of the three evaluation scenarios we assume
one server with computing capacity of 32x2.1 GHz (a 32-core
CPU running at 2.1 GHz).
2) Security service requests: As introduced in Section V, a
security service request is configured by the TSP to provision
security for user applications (see the CCTV example in Sec-
tion V). For evaluation purposes, we automatically generate
requests composed of a random number of chains, ranging
between 1 and 5. Each chain comprises a random subset of
VSNFs from the list presented in Table IV, with a maximum of
3 VSNFs per chain (i.e., up to 15 VSNFs per user application).
Based on the use case scenarios illustrated in Sections IV and
V (web browsing, online gaming, CCTV system), we believe
these are reasonable values.
The CPU requirements for the VSNFs are presented in Table
IV. It should be noted that the values of γu (cycle/bit) reported
in Table IV are estimated based on the results of experiments
reported in scientific papers or product datasheets and obtained
under optimal conditions, with only one VSNF running at a
time. The impact on the network traffic caused by concurrent
TABLE V
COMPARISON BETWEEN THE PESS HEURISTIC AND THE PESS
ILP-BASED ALGORITHM ON THREE NETWORK SCENARIOS.
Network model Heuristic embeddingcost overhead1
Average Time (sec)
Heuristic Solver
Random 0.06% 0.002 150
Stanford 0.07% 0.003 700
GARR 0.5% 0.003 1500
1 Average overhead with respect to the solver embedding cost.
VSNFs running on the same node are estimated with Eq. (13)
and (15). These values of γu have been used to perform the
evaluation tests described in the remainder of this section,
with the aim of enabling interested readers to replicate the
experiments in similar conditions. However, we also obtained
comparable results using random values.
B. Comparison between solver and heuristic
Methodology. In this experiment, we compare the PESS
ILP-based algorithm implemented with the solver and the
PESS heuristic on the Stanford and GARR network models,
and on Baraba´si-Albert random topologies with 20 nodes and
36 links.
The security service requests are generated using a Poisson
process with exponential distribution of inter-arrival and hold-
ing times. Once a service expires, the resources allocated to
it are released.
We start by simulating the processing of 105 service
requests using the PESS heuristic. Once a stable network
utilization (load) is reached, we save the subsequent service
requests along with the network state and the heuristic so-
lution. In a second stage, we run the solver to compute the
optimal solution for each of the requests saved in the previous
stage and we compare the results with the recorded heuristic
solutions. This process is repeated with values of network load
ranging between 1000 and 20000 Erlang.
Metrics. (i) Heuristic embedding cost overhead over opti-
mal solutions and (ii) embedding time.
Discussion. As explained in Section VI, the PESS heuristic
places all the chains of a service request on a single path
to efficiently guarantee that the QoS Constraint (12) and the
region Constraint (17) are respected. Once the path is found,
the heuristic places the VSNFs of all the chains on a maximum
of three nodes in the chosen path: the one with the highest
residual computing capacity and the ones specified with the
region constraint (if any). Such implementation choices reduce
the solution space in case of requests with multiple chains
and VSNFs. On the other hand, Constraints (12) and (17) also
narrow down the solution space for the solver, often resulting
in single-path optimal solutions. As a result, we measure a
marginal embedding cost overhead of the heuristic solutions
with respect to the optimal solutions on all three evaluation
scenarios (see Table V).
It is worth analyzing the reason behind nearly one order
of magnitude difference between the GARR topology and
the other two network scenarios. When the initial solution is
computed, the heuristic algorithm selects the endpoint ep2 ∈
EP2 to further explore the solution space, thus excluding
the other endpoints in EP2 (line 11 in Algorithm 1). This
strategy improves the scalability of the heuristic in case of
large endpoint sets EP2, at the cost of slightly reducing the
quality of the solutions.
In this regard, on the GARR network the border region is
used as endpoint EP2 for 80% of the requests, to simulate a
real-world TSP network where most of the traffic is directed
towards the Internet. Hence, good solutions involving four of
the five nodes in the border are not considered during the
second stage of the heuristic, possibly leading to less accurate
solutions. Conversely, a border region of only two nodes is
defined in the Stanford topology (the two border routers),
while no special regions at all are configured for the random
networks (thus, always |EP2| = 1), resulting in more precise
embeddings.
As reported in Table V, the embedding time measured for
the heuristic is 3 ms, on average, with the Stanford and GARR
topologies, and below 3 ms, on average, with the random
topologies. In contrast, the solver takes between 150 and
1500 s, on average, to find the optimal solutions on the three
network scenarios. Please note that, the results related to the
GARR network are limited to service requests with less than
10 VSNFs. Due to the size of the GARR topology (46 nodes
and 83 links), above this threshold the solver runs out of
memory and it is terminated by the operating system.
C. PESS vs application-agnostic provisioning
Methodology. We start two experiments in parallel using
two identical copies of the same physical network graph. At
each iteration, we generate a service request with application-
specific QoS and security requirements. In Experiment 1, the
security service is provisioned on one copy of the network with
the PESS heuristic. In Experiment 2, the service is provisioned
on the second copy of the network by simulating the standard
approach (adopted, for instance, in [15] and used in this test
as baseline), where two application-agnostic chains of VSNFs
(one for each direction of the traffic) are applied to the user
traffic to fulfill all the security requirements regardless of the
specific needs of the applications. At the end of each iteration,
the two copies of the network are updated according to the
resources consumed by the respective provisioning approach.
As in the previous experiment, security service requests are
generated using a Poisson process with exponential distribu-
tion of inter-arrival and holding times. We run 105 iterations,
starting to collect statistics after the first 8·104 requests (once a
stable network load is reached). The two parallel experiments
are repeated with different network load values.
Metrics. Blocking probability, consumption of computing
resources, end-to-end latency of the chains and number of
active services in the network.
Discussion. Fig. 3 compares the performance of the PESS
application-aware service provisioning algorithm (PESS in the
figure) and the baseline approach (Base) on random networks.
Fig. 3. Comparison between the baseline (Base) and the PESS approaches on random networks (20 nodes and 36 links).
Fig. 4. Comparison between the baseline (Base) and the PESS approaches on the GARR network.
Fig. 5. Comparison between the baseline (Base) and the PESS approaches on the Stanford backbone network.
The experimental results are plotted as functions of the net-
work load, which is expressed in terms of the average number
of security service requests in the network (Erlang).
The efficient usage of the computing resources reported in
Fig. 3(a) is a major benefit of the application-aware provi-
sioning mechanism proposed in this work. In particular, PESS
avoids inefficiencies, such as a high bandwidth video stream
being processed by a high resource demanding IPS (see the
CCTV example in Section V), ultimately leading to a lower
blocking probability and to a higher number of active services
in the network, as shown in Fig. 3(b) and 3(c) respectively.
The benefits of PESS in terms of reduced end-to-end latency
Fig. 6. Heuristic execution time as a function of the number of physical nodes. The plot on the left reports the results with m = 1, 3, 5 in the Baraba´si-Albert
model when generating random graphs, while the one on the right side shows the measurements with fixed m = 5 at different sizes of endpoint EP2.
are reported in Fig. 3(d). The plot illustrates the ratio between
the average end-to-end latency of the chains in Experiment 2
(Baseline), and the average end-to-end latency of the chains
in Experiment 1 (PESS). At low loads, when the nodes in
the networks of both experiments are only partially busy, the
value of this ratio is between 1.1 and 1.4. In other words, under
typical operational conditions, the average end-to-end latency
of chains provisioned with our approach is 10-40% lower
than the baseline. Moreover, when the nodes in Experiment
2 are heavily loaded, the processing delay introduced by busy
nodes becomes very high, as modeled with Eq. (12). This
phenomenon produces high ratios, represented by the spike
in the plot, which gradually decrease at high loads when
the nodes in the network of Experiment 1 also become fully
loaded.
Fig. 4 reports the results of the simulations performed with
the GARR network. In this case, we are particularly interested
in observing the behavior of our approach in the presence
of a critical region (from the security viewpoint) such as the
border of the network. In order to analyse this, we empirically
configure the random generator of service requests to generate
80% of requests directed towards the Internet (i.e., crossing the
border of the network). In Fig. 4(b), it can be noted that both
PESS and the baseline have similar blocking probability at low
loads (below 6000). This is a consequence of the bandwidth
usage on links towards the border region, which is almost
always identical for Experiment 1 and Experiment 2. The two
curves start diverging at load 6000, i.e. when the border region
runs out of computing resources with the baseline approach
(as shown with dashed curves in Fig. 4(a)). The probability
curves in Fig. 4(b) begin to re-converge at load 12000, when
the border region with PESS also becomes full. Solid curves
in Fig. 4(a) indicate that, between loads 1000 and 6000, when
the blocking probability of the two experiments is comparable,
PESS requires around 50% less computing resources than the
baseline to provision the security services.
The results obtained with the Stanford network model are
presented in Fig. 5. In contrast to the GARR network, where
busy links in sparsely connected areas cause rejected requests
at low loads, in these experiments we see a non-zero blocking
probability only when the border region of the Stanford
network runs out of computing resources, i.e. at loads 4000
and 6000 for the baseline and PESS, respectively.
Similar to the random networks scenario, we can observe
a higher number of active services and a lower end-to-end
latency with PESS in both GARR and Stanford networks. The
plots are omitted due to space constraints.
D. Scalability evaluation
Methodology. We evaluate the scalability of the PESS
heuristic on Baraba´si-Albert random topologies of between
10 and 1000 nodes. For each of these topologies, we simulate
the processing of 1000 service requests and report the average
execution time.
Metrics. Average execution time.
Discussion. In the first experiment (reported in the leftmost
plot of Fig. 6) we used |EP2| = 1 for all the service requests
and we varied the attachment parameter m, which determines
the number of edges to attach from a new node to existing
nodes when generating the random network. This influences
the execution time of the shortest path algorithm. For instance,
m = 1 produces tree-like topologies with |E| = |N | − 1. The
general rule for computing the number of edges in Baraba´si-
Albert networks is |E| = m · |N | −m2. As illustrated in Fig.
6, even for very large networks with 1000 nodes and 4975
edges (m = 5 in the figure), on average, the PESS heuristic
can provision a security service in around 200 ms.
In the second experiment, we used a fixed value of m = 5
(the worst case in the first experiment) and we varied the size
of endpoint EP2, as the number of nodes in EP2 determines
how long PESS takes to compute the initial solution. In
the rightmost plot in Fig. 6, the black solid curve is the
reference measurement from the first experiment. As shown
by the dashed curves in the plot, the average execution time
increases linearly with the size of endpoint |EP2|, up to
around 250 ms in the worst case with |N | = 1000, |E| = 4975
and |EP2| = 500.
As introduced in Section I and formulated in Section V,
the VSNFs placement model and heuristic proposed in this
work target NFV-enabled systems where security services
are dynamically provisioned and updated based on users’
applications and their security and QoS requirements. Such
systems require efficient provisioning strategies to minimize
the exposure of such applications to cyber attacks. With respect
to these objectives, the experimental results from the PESS
scalability evaluation are encouraging and clearly indicate
the potential for practical implementation of the proposed
application-aware approach in real-world scenarios.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have tackled the problem of the progressive
provisioning of security services by means of VSNFs. The
proposed approach, called PESS, takes into account security
and QoS requirements of user applications, while ensuring that
computing and network resources are accurately utilised. We
have discussed the rationale behind our design decisions and
presented an ILP formulation and a heuristic algorithm that
solve the placement problem. Although we have focused our
work on security services, the PESS approach is applicable
to more complex scenarios, where heterogeneous network
services provided by means of generic VNFs coexist.
The evaluation results demonstrate the benefits of PESS for
both users and operators, with savings in resource utilization
and in end-to-end latency. We have also shown that the
heuristic implementation of the proposed application-aware
approach produces near-optimal solutions and scales well in
large and dense networks, indicating the potential of PESS in
real-world scenarios.
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